{"product_id":"two-arguments-for-the-identity-of-indiscernibles-hardcover","title":"Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles - Hardcover","description":"\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cp style=\"text-align: right;\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"https:\/\/reportcopyrightinfringement.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eReport copyright infringement\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/a\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eby \u003cb\u003eGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra\u003c\/b\u003e (Author)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, since what is usually known as the trivial version of the principle is consistent with objects differing only numerically. He provides two positive arguments for the Principle: one based on broadly Humean considerations excluding a certain kind of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on ideas about what grounds the having of certain properties by objects. This book also presents two new arguments against restricted versions of the principle according to which, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. It is further argued that one of the arguments for the\u003cbr\u003eweakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects. The conclusion is drawn that, necessarily, there are no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that differ only numerically.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003ch3\u003eAuthor Biography\u003c\/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003eGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, \u003cem\u003eUniversity of Oxford\u003c\/em\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra obtained his PhD from the University of Cambridge, where he also held a Junior Research Fellowship (Churchill College), and has taught at Edinburgh, Oxford, Nottingham, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, and currently again at Oxford. He received the Philip Leverhulme Prize in 2001. He is currently an associate editor for the journal \u003cem\u003eMind\u003c\/em\u003e. He has published extensively on metaphysics, on topics such as truth and truthmakers, nominalism, the Identity of Indiscernibles, nihilism, and early modern philosophy, mainly on Leibniz, but also on Descartes and Kant.\u003cbr\u003e\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eNumber of Pages:\u003c\/strong\u003e 144\u003c\/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eDimensions:\u003c\/strong\u003e 0.9 x 8.2 x 5.5 IN\u003c\/div\u003e\n            \u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003ePublication Date:\u003c\/strong\u003e December 22, 2022\u003c\/div\u003e\n            ","brand":"BooksCloud","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47336827420921,"sku":"9780192866868","price":148.77,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0789\/2782\/3097\/files\/aXdoVnJWckRvL1R2Mmo4bzdZVHNLUT09.webp?v=1769671332","url":"https:\/\/bookscloud.io\/products\/two-arguments-for-the-identity-of-indiscernibles-hardcover","provider":"BooksCloud Book Dropshipping","version":"1.0","type":"link"}